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literature of how people predict their own usage of a service. We estimate the model using a
unique panel data set obtained from a large rentailer, and find it provides a good fit to the data.
Using the model estimates we obtain a metric indicating a latent customer tendency to buy at
full price (compared to buying at a lower price or renting). Other diagnostic information from
the model may help convert renters into buyers. First, expected viewing may be pitched to the
consumer in order to persuade consumers that the movie will be well utilized. Secondly, we use
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Introduction

There has been a growing interest in research and modelling issues related to the entertainment
industry in general and the movie industry in particular (see Eliashberg, Elberse, & Leenders, 2006
for a recent review). Much less research effort has been made in studying home video entertainment,
and in particular, the managerial decision making in this context.
A combination of factors such as the rapid adoption of DVD players (76% penetration in the
U.S. by the end of 2006 and 70% penetration in Western Europe by the end of 2007), the number
of titles available to consumers (estimated to be over 75,000), and the decreasing prices of DVDs
have made the home video market grow quickly over the past ten years (Entertainment Merchant
Association [EMA], 2006; International Video Foundation [IVF], 2008). An increase in the number
of home video retail outlets as well as the options they offer to the consumer is another key growth
factor.
Home video outlets can be classified into two different types - sell-through retailers and rentailers. Rentailers, as they are called in the industry, are retail outlets whose main business comes from
rentals. Retailers and rentailers share a total home video business in the U.S. estimated in 2006 as
$24.9 billion: $16.5 B in buying and $8.4 B in rental (EMA, 2006).
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In addition to buying new

titles, increasingly consumers have the option of buying previously viewed (used) titles, which are
usually marked at a substantial discount. Interestingly, the consumer spending on buying DVDs
includes an estimate of spending on previously viewed titles of $1.1 B (EMA, 2006). The types
and shares of the various home video outlets for sell-through retailers are: mass merchants (50% of
the business), video specialists (12%), consumer electronics stores (9%), online sellers (9%), direct
mail companies such as Columbia House (7%), and supermarkets (4%). For rentailers, the types
and shares are: major chains such as Blockbuster, Hollywood Entertainment, and Movie Gallery
(43%), independently owned video stores (39%), pure online subscription rentailers (16%), and
supermarkets (2%) (Adams Media Research, 2005).
New emerging technologies and content distribution outlets present challenges to the future
growth of the traditional home video retailing market. One recent example is the Vudu box, which
sits on top of a TV and can access over 10,000 titles from the internet on demand for both rental
1

The 2007 total home video spending in Europe is estimated at e11.5 B, with e9.6 B spent on purchasing and

e1.9 B spent on renting (IVF, 2008).
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and purchase. Consequently, retailers and rentailers have been experimenting with various business
models, trying to sustain their future business. For example, Walmart, the largest seller of DVDs
in the U.S., discontinued its policy of renting videos online through its downloading service in
what was widely perceived as a failed experiment (Richtel & Stone, 2008). Meanwhile, Apple,
which has made movies available for purchase online through its iTunes store since 2006, decided
to give customers the option to rent in January 2008. Thus, some of the business models focus
only on consumer rentals, while others focus only on consumers buying only new DVDs, others on
consumers buying new DVDs and previously viewed titles (PVTs), and yet others are trying to
capitalize on both the rent and buy opportunities. Some operate only online, others both online
and offline. Netflix, for instance, represents a rentailer operating a DVD online rental service, with
6 million subscribers who create their movie wish list (from a library of 75,000 titles), receive the
DVDs from the list by mail, return the viewed movies by mail, and then receive the next title on
their list. NetFlix has begun offering the option to purchase PVTs to its subscribers. Columbia
House with their DVD Club represents the sell-through only business model. It offers 5 DVDs for
$0.49 each for consumers who join the club and who then become obligated to buy 5 more DVDs
within the next 2 years, at regular club prices. Blockbuster represents the “rent and buy” business
model with both “brick and click” presence. On its web site, the subscriber can find a rental service
very similar to that of Netflix, while at the same time, the consumer can purchase the same title
as well as PVTs. See Table 1 for more examples.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 1 About Here]
—————————————————————

There are broader implications to the study of rentailers in the home video market. Videos
are a type of information good, such as books, music and software (Varian, 2000).
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Since these

goods can be copied, shared, resold and rented, there exists an increasing array of options for
consumers to access them. A key feature shared by these examples is that the option chosen
critically depends on the customer’s estimate of future utilization. There has been growing interest
in economics and marketing (e.g., Nunes, 2000; DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006) in understanding
usage expectations when confronted between a flat fee option for unlimited use and a pay-per-use
2

Roehl and Varian (1996) present many interesting parallels in the historical development between the home-video

market and the growth of profit-seeking rental libraries in Britain 1725-1850.
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option. This feature is central to many managerial and retailer related issues such as supplyside contracting (Mortimer 2008), pricing and sharing (Varian, 2000), and inventory management
(Dana & Spier, 2001; Cachon & Lariviere, 2005). Our focus is on optimal pricing and customer
segmentation for a rentailer who rents and sells both new and previously viewed titles. While our
results are specific to the home-video market, our methods may be applicable to retailers of other
information goods.
While there exists conventional wisdom as well as some industry-based anecdotal evidence
concerning consumer behavior in the home video outlet, to our knowledge this area has received
scant attention by marketing scholars. Statements from the industry include, for example, the
observation from the former president of Sony Home Entertainment that some consumers are
“collectors,” while others are merely “watchers” (Gertner, 2004). According to the EMA U.S.
survey (2006), the average “active” DVD household purchased 18 DVDs and rented 23 DVDs in
that year, and the average household owns more than 40 DVD movies. There has also been an
attempt to profile buyers/renters based on technographics (Video Software Dealers Association,
2005). Wedel and Kamakura (2002) note that in industries where customer retention is a primary
goal, segmentation “has become very effective so that firms can identify, profile, target and reach
segments using their own customer transaction databases.” We propose here more rigorous metrics
based on transaction data that can assist in segmenting customers as collectors and watchers.
We assume that, similar to book buyers who head to bookstores with a purpose, a key characteristic of consumer behavior at the rentailer is that the customer walks into the rentailer knowing
he or she will come out with a movie, either rented or bought (Random House/Zogby International,
2008). Hence, for most, if not all the rentailer’s customers, the option of leaving the rentailer emptyhanded is not viable. From a title selection standpoint, we assume that the decision of which movie
to watch can be either planned or opportunistic (Bucklin & Lattin, 1991), with the decision made
either before entering or once in the store. In terms of the transaction decision (rent vs. buy), we
assume that the decision is opportunistic, i.e., the consumer decides in the store whether to rent or
buy it. For example, a customer may enter the store intending to rent one movie, and may change
his or her mind if the store carries the specific title in a PVT format, or if the store has available
another new title at an attractive price. One main reason why it is likely to be opportunistic is
that the consumer does not know with certainty when (if ever) the title is available as a PVT and
at what price. Hence, for consumers interested in a certain title, waiting for a title to be offered at
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a PVT price at some point in the future is not a viable option. On the other hand, if the consumer
is informed while in the store that a PVT version of the title happens to be available, buying it is
a viable option.
In this paper we take the rentailer’s perspective. To manage the video outlet effectively,
management needs to understand its customer (subscriber) behavior. More specifically, segmenting
the customer base, targeting individual customers, pitching expected utilization that the rentailer
may feel is relevant to a particular consumer (“I believe that you will watch this title at least
10 times”), and pricing accordingly are decisions of highest importance in managing the rentailer
effectively. In contrast to the research on information goods, in this paper we adopt an empirical
micro-level modeling approach assisting managers in making these decisions. Using a unique panel
data set of individual-level transactions for customers at a home-video outlet, we first descriptively
develop a metric that can be used to rank customers depending on their inherent tendency to
buy, we relate movie buyability to several covariates, and we estimate expected viewing for each
individual-movie transaction. Secondly, we normatively illustrate how the rentailer manager should
customize price, for both new and PVT (if available) titles, to maximize expected transaction profit.
We also report several empirical findings that contribute to the literature on the entertainment
and home video industries. The data obtained reveal that buying is a relatively rare but profitable
event for the rentailer. The model estimates imply that individual differences rather than title
differences explain the majority of variation in the rent vs. buy decision. Hence, it may make more
sense for the rentailer to emphasize customer, rather than movie, segmentation. Nevertheless,
certain observable movie attributes like whether the movie is of the action genre or rated R are
significant predictors of whether a title will be rented or bought. Customers in our data have
the option to purchase in advance a set of rentals and are given quantity discounts on the rental
price depending on how many they purchase in advance. Interestingly, we find that customers who
self-select into the lowest-costing rental price plan are more intrinsic buyers rather than renters.
Our research objectives - understanding local home-video subscriber behavior, segmenting
customers, and pricing accordingly - are in line with previous research which has addressed the
unique managerial problems of a particular theatrical location showing movies (Swami, Eliashberg,
& Weinberg, 1999; Eliashberg, Swami, Weinberg, & Wierenga, 2001; Eliashberg et al., 2008).
Hence, the results reported in the paper are limited in their generalizability, but they are applicable
to the sub-population of rentailers and their clienteles that are similar to the focal rentailer we
4

analyze in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature on the home
video industry and behavioral models of customer choice between flat fee and pay-per-use options.
Section 3 describes the context and the model. In Section 4 we described the data employed to
estimate the model. The empirical results and the managerial implications are provided in Section
5. Section 6 summarizes the work and provides suggestions for future research.

2

Relevant Literature

There are three different areas of literature relevant to our research and to which we contribute:
Managing the video rental retailer within the supply chain: A number of theoretical
models which address the home video retailer and its pricing and inventory decisions under vertical
contracts have been developed. Dana and Spier (2001), Cachon and Lariviere (2005) and Gerchak,
Cho, and Ray (2006) all focus on the effect of different contracts with the distributor (e.g., revenue
sharing) on the store’s shelf-space management and the overall supply chain performance. For
example, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) consider a rental-only video retailer, and find that revenue
sharing contracts, where the retailer agrees to pay the supplier a portion of the rental revenue,
coordinates the supply chain so that double marginalization is avoided (i.e., the retailer chooses
the optimal price and quantity levels for both retailer and distributor). This finding mirrors the
experience of Blockbuster, the largest video retailer in the U.S., which was able to increase availability of titles by striking revenue-sharing contracts with suppliers beginning in 1998. We revisit
this issue in the context of the customized pricing illustration.
Models of consumer demand to address home-video distributor strategies: There
are a few papers that investigate empirically the effects of home video distributor strategies on
retailer performance. Mortimer (2008) empirically evaluates the effects of revenue sharing on retailer
profits and inventories, while taking into account the selection effect of the contract choice. She finds
that both distributor and retailer profits increase by about 10% from revenue sharing. Mortimer
(2007) investigates optimal indirect price discrimination for the distributor and welfare effects
given U.S. copyright law, which forbids direct price discrimination. She considers buying and
renting as vertically differentiated products, and shows that distributors, in choosing whether to
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adopt “rental” or sell-through pricing, are in effect choosing whether to use inter-temporal price
discrimination to segment high and low value customers.
A key strategic decision on the part of distributors is whether to release a title simultaneously
to both rental and sales markets, or to release it sequentially. Before the advent of DVDs, 90% of
VHS videos were released sequentially - first to the home video rental market, then to the retail
market. In contrast, DVDs are mostly released simultaneously to both rentailers and retailers.
Studying these strategic decisions, Hu, Eliashberg and Raju (2004) develop a model of the consumer
that incorporates heterogeneity and forward looking behavior in terms of the number of expected
viewings. They find that the optimal release strategy is influenced by both movie characteristics and
heterogeneity in consumers’ expected number of viewings. The consumer model draws on Varian
(2000), who examines whether a firm without the ability to inter-temporally price discriminate
should price to sell or rent an information good. Both these models assume that the consumer
is concerned merely with the number of times the good will be used. Another relevant study is
Hui, Eliashberg, and George (2008). They focus, however, only on the sell-through market (i.e.,
the consumer purchasing decision). When a DVD title is announced prior to actual distribution,
consumers often pre-order the title and receive it as soon as it is released. Alternatively, once a title
becomes available (i.e., formally released), consumers can purchase it with minimal delay. They
develop an individual-level behavioral model that captures the aggregate pre-order/post-release
sales of DVDs.
Consumer choice between a flat-rate and pay-per-use: In general, the decision of
whether to buy or rent an asset shares characteristics with a more general set of decisions often
encountered in daily life: the decision of whether to pay a flat fee for unlimited consumption or to
pay at each time of consumption. Some common examples of firms that offer both flat-rate and payper-use options found in the literature include health club membership, online grocery shopping,
and telephone calling plans. The goal of this recent literature in economics and marketing is to draw
conclusions about the decision process from initial contract choice and subsequent usage. Here, the
literature has found a consumer bias for the flat fee in most cases and a bias for the pay-per-use in
a few cases (Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006). Nunes (2000) presents a behavioral study of consumers
who use simplified heuristics to estimate usage in the context of online grocery shopping, gym
membership, and swimming pool fees. In his model, a consumer estimates a threshold and matches
the probability that usage exceeds the threshold with the probability of choosing the flat-fee option.

6

This helps explain why consumers habitually overestimate their usage and choose the flat fee option.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) show that gym members who choose the flat monthly fee end
up paying more per visit than the offered per-visit price. They model the consumer as forwardlooking, but with time-inconsistent preferences, and examine consumers’ sequence of price and
usage choices. Miravete (2002) finds a bias toward the pay-per-use option, based on transactional
data from a tariff experiment. Another explanation for the flat fee bias found in the literature is
that unlimited consumption includes an option value if consumers are uncertain of their preferences
(Kridel, Lehman & Weisman, 1993).
Our approach differs substantially from the home video papers cited above in that we directly
develop our model at the individual level and test it with individual level data. While Mortimer
(2007) and Hu et. al. (2004) develop individual level consumer demand models of renting and
buying, they do not test them directly. Instead, they derive the implications of such consumer
demand models on distributor strategy and use differences in distributor strategy and realized
aggregate sales data across movies as evidence for the model. Unlike Varian (2000) but similar to
Hu et al. and Nunes (2000) we consider the expected number of viewings as a key driver of the
consumer rent or buy decision.
Secondly, we differ from the extant literature by focusing on the video rentailer and its customers, and not the distributor. This requires that we use a model that can render individual-level
buy and rent probabilities. These predictions can help the rentailer better understand its customer
base as well as its portfolio of movies, and consequently design customized pricing, a scenario we
analyze in Section 5.

3

Model Development

We first develop the model of renting vs. buying at the individual level and pay particular attention
to the features of this model that make it amenable for addressing our managerial problems. We
next discuss the rental price plan model, which allows us to control for selectivity bias in the
parameter estimates.

7

3.1

A Model of Renting vs. Buying Based on Breakeven Watching

We model the rent or buy decision as an in-store, opportunistic decision (see Bucklin & Lattin,
1991). Our modeling objective is to provide a predictive yet representational model of the consumer’s decision of whether to rent or buy a chosen title. Evidence regarding the amount of
pre-orders of DVD titles (Hui et. al., 2008) suggests that buyers are not sensitive to future price
changes when they make their purchasing decisions. While there may exist a segment of consumers
which first rents the DVD and then buys it, our focus here is on modeling the segment (captured
in our data) that either rents or buys the title.

3

Nunes (2000) provides experimental evidence that consumers often form break-even thresholds
of expected usage to simplify the decision of whether to play a flat fee for unlimited consumption or
pay per usage occasion (e.g., gym memberships). In the proposed model, the consumer is concerned
with whether the anticipated number of times he or she is likely to watch the movie (N ) is above a
certain threshold. This threshold is the ratio of the price of buying (defined as K, typically $20) to
the price renting (k, typically $3.50). If the consumer’s anticipated number of viewings is greater
than or equal to the threshold, the consumer decision is to buy the title. Otherwise, the decision
is to rent it. More formally,
Buy

if N ≥

K
k

Rent

if N <

K
k

(1)

From the modeler’s standpoint, the buy/rent choice is treated probabilistically and N , the
number of times up until the final watching of the the movie, is a random variable. We therefore
estimate the probability that this random variable is greater than the threshold by assigning N
a (discrete) probability distribution over the range (1, 2, . . .). We choose the shifted geometric
distribution as a reasonable modelling approximation for parsimony and interpretability. It has
only one parameter, p, interpreted as the probability that the next watching is the final one.
The break even number is the threshold ratio of purchase price to rental price, which we
denote τ = floor[K/k]. In the empirical application we make p a function of both individual i
and movie j characteristics. Using some simple tools from a geometric series we can write (see
3

Our data, described in the next section, only cover a 6 month period, with many movies introduced after the

start of the data. Hence we are unlikely to observe multiple transactions with the same title.
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Appendix A):
Pij (Buy | pij ) =

X

pij (1 − pij )x−1 = (1 − pij )τ −1

(2)

x≥τ

A higher value of pij means that the consumer will stop watching the video sooner. This naturally
pushes the probability of buying lower. We use the above model to address managerial issues of
critical interest to the rentailer: segmentation, usage pitching, and pricing. We discuss each issue
in turn.
First, we can use the model outlined above to examine whether differences in individuals or
differences in titles can explain the majority of variation in the rent vs. buy decision. The answer
to this question has implications for whether the rentailer should emphasize segmenting customers
or titles. We allow for the key viewing parameter pij to be a flexible function of both individual
and title characteristics by letting:
logit(pij ) = βi Zj + ej , ej ∼ N (0, σe2 )

(3)

where Zj is a column vector (m x 1) including an intercept and a set of observable movie characteristics such as box office gross, critical review score, MPAA rating, genre and distributor information
(more information is provided in the data section), βi is a row vector (1 x m) of customer preferences for these characteristics, and ej is a zero mean random error, with variance σe2 , that captures
the effect of unobserved movie characteristics on anticipated viewing. In particular βi,1 (i.e., the
intercept) can be interpreted as customer i’s unobserved propensity to rent after controlling for his
or her preferences for the various movie characteristics. Once estimated, we use estimates of βi,1
to segment customers into collectors (intrinsic buyers) with a high reservation price, opportunistic
buyers who only buy when the price is low enough, and watchers (intrinsic renters) who expect to
watch any movie just a few times.
Second, the expected number of anticipated viewings for a given customer i of a given title
j is

1
pij .

We argue subsequently that this metric can be pitched to the customer in some cases in

order to convert a rental into a purchase transaction at the point of sale. Lastly, we use estimates
of pij to customize prices of both new and PVT titles that maximize profitability in the long-run,
taking into consideration that a customer may re-rent a particular movie.

9

3.2

A Model for Rental Price Plan Choice

In addition to renting and buying, the rentailer whose data we have access to offers its customers the
option of paying in bulk for a quantity of rentals, with mild quantity discounts given to customers
who pay up front for more rentals. Hence, the customer’s decision of whether to buy or rent a
given title may be dependent on his or her choice of rental price plan. This represents a form of
selectivity bias and we address this issue by simultaneously estimating the rent/buy model outlined
in equations 2 and 3 with a model of selecting rental price plans developed below. Following
Maddala (1983), we allow the individual level error terms of these models to be correlated.
There are four rental price plans observed in the data. Let Ti = {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the rental
plan chosen by customer i.

4

The four options available to the consumer are: (1) no prepayment,

full price, k = $3.50; (2) prepay for 10 rentals, rental price is k = $3.00; (3) prepay for 25 rentals,
rental price is k = $2.75; and (4) prepay for 50 rentals, rental price is k = $2.50. The majority of
customers (87%) do not choose to buy in bulk, and so pay $3.50 (T = 1).
A natural choice for a statistical model of Ti is an ordinal model, since the prices are not
continuous but have a definite ordering from lowest to highest. We follow Congdon’s (2003) development of the ordinal logit model in modeling the customer’s choice of rental price plan:
P (Ti ≤ ` | θ` , βi,m+1 ) =

eθ` −βi,m+1
1 + eθ` −βi,m+1

for ` = 1, 2, 3

(4)

Here θ` represents the cut point corresponding to the `th price plan, and βi,m+1 represents the
unobserved propensity of the consumer to rent in bulk. We need three cut points to identify four
possible price plan choices. All other things remaining equal if βi,m+1 is larger, there is a greater
likelihood that the customer will opt for the 50 rental price plan at k = 2.50. We take differences
of the cumulative distribution function to calculate the probability that a customer will choose one
of the four available price plans:
P (Ti = 1) = P (Ti ≤ 1)
P (Ti = k) = P (Ti ≤ k) − P (Ti ≤ k − 1) for k = 2, 3

(5)

P (Ti = 4) = 1 − P (Ti ≤ 3)
Following Congdon (2003), to identify the model we fix the first threshold θ1 to zero. The other
4

There is no time subscript because there are no rental price plan changes observed in our data.
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two thresholds are sampled from
θ2

∼ N (0, σθ2 ) I(0, θ3 )

θ3

∼ N (0, σθ2 ) I(θ2 , ∞)

(6)

where I(x, y) indicates that the two estimated threshold are drawn from truncated normal distributions to ensure that θ2 < θ3 .
We allow the customer preferences (βi,1:m ) and propensity to prepay for rentals in bulk (βi,m+1 )
to be correlated by using a multivariate normal prior:
βi0 ∼ MVN(β̄, Σ)

(7)

where β̄ is a column vector (m+1 x 1) of mean customer preference coefficients, and Σ is a variance
covariance matrix (m+1 x m+1). Of particular interest is the correlation between estimates of
the propensity to rent and propensity to prepay for rentals in bulk. On the one hand, customers
may substitute away from buying to renting to reflect the relatively lower cost of renting. On the
other hand, if the income effect dominates, instead of renting more, the customer may transfer the
savings gains from renting at a lower price to buying more.

4

Data and Estimation

In this section, we briefly discuss the nature of the data and the hierarchical Bayes procedure used
to estimate the parameters.

4.1

Data

The data we use to calibrate the model were provided by a home video rentailer which operates
online as well as offline (6 stores in Philadelphia and New York City), rents and sells new and PVT
titles, VHS and DVDs, including both theatrical and direct to video titles. In 2002, it was ranked
15th in revenue across the U.S. for specialty stores (exclusively DVD/VHS) according to Video
Store Magazine.
Within each store, the rentailer maintains two separate areas, one for renting, the other for
buying. We focus on DVD transactions for two reasons. First, DVDs are priced to sell in the $10 $25 region compared to VHS tapes, which can be priced as high as $100. Because studios are more
11

inclined to adopt sell-through pricing for DVDs than VHS (see Mortimer, 2006; Hu et al., 2004),
the DVD price makes the option of purchase more reasonable to the consumer. Secondly, given
the scenario we model, both options - renting and buying - have to be available at the same time
for the choice to be legitimate. As mentioned earlier, DVDs are most commonly released for rental
and purchase markets simultaneously, whereas VHS tapes are more often released sequentially.
The data in our sample come from the rentailer’s largest store, and cover a six-month time
period: the last two quarters of 2003. Overall there are over 20,000 titles which are either rented
or bought during this time horizon, and over 10,000 customers who either buy or rent these titles.
In order to estimate the model, we first reduce the dataset by focusing on a subset of movies and
customers.
Two criteria were used in filtering down the list of titles in our data set. First, we selected the
top 100 grossing home-video titles that were released over the observation period.

5

The second

criteria was that the movie be available simultaneously for renting and buying at the rentailer whose
data we use. We were able to verify this for 76 of the 100 movies in the sample. Hence, the useable
data set consists of 76 movies which were released over the 6 month time horizon of our data. A
list of the movies used in the analysis is provided in Appendix B. The total number of transactions
from these 76 movies is over 17,000, which presents some difficulty for model estimation. To reduce
the dataset to a more manageable size, we randomly sample half of the transactions. Since we
have randomly sampled transactions within the set of 76 movies, one can use estimates from the
sample to make inferences about the population of customers who transact at least once with these
movies. For example, to make inferences about the distribution of intrinsic renters and buyers in
this population, one can draw from the posterior distribution of the population level coefficients
(using equation 7). To make inferences about all the customers in the database, including those
that do not transact with the top 76 movies, however, one needs to assume that the distribution of
customer preferences is the same for customers who transact with the 76 movies and those that do
not. This assumption should be empirically tested before attempting to make such an inference.
The final data set thus leaves us with a total of 8,801 buy or rent transactions of 2,018
customers with 76 movies. We present histograms of the number of purchases and rentals across
consumers in Figure 1 (n = 2,018).
5

The practice of restricting analysis to the top N brands is common in scanner panel data. Zanutto and Bradlow

(2006) discuss the effects of such sampling procedures.
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—————————————————————
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
—————————————————————

The data reveal that a small fraction of customers buy (7 %), and the overall proportion of
buy transactions in the data is low (3 %). A store statistic sometimes cited in the trade literature is
the ratio of rented to purchased units. For this rentailer, the ratio is 34.3. Using some back of the
envelope calculations to convert sales figures into units, we estimate that the market ratio in 2003
to be approximately 4.5, which suggests that the rentailer in question had fewer purchases relative
to the overall market.

6

The abundance of rentals to purchased units implies that there exists a

sizeable opportunity for the rentailer of interest to convert many of these rental transactions to
purchases.
We supplement our data with a set of nine (i.e., m = 9) movie covariates (Zj ) collected from
IMDB.com and metacritic.com. IMDB.com provides raw data such as box office gross, MPAA
rating, genre and distributor information. Metacritic.com aggregates reviews to come up with a
0-100 point scale, the Metascore, which is a weighted average of individual critic scores.

4.2

Model Estimation

The limited observations for some individuals and movies in the data set present an empirical
challenge which can be overcome by using a hierarchical Bayes estimation procedure. Two features
of our data set make it amenable to using a hierarchical Bayes estimation procedure. First, our
data set is somewhat sparse. We observe many individuals who never buy and some movies that
are never bought. Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of interest would likely be
driven to the boundary of acceptable parameter values. The hierarchical Bayes estimation allows
information to be shared when observations are sparse. The number of observations per individual
and movie varies greatly. For individuals, the range is 1 - 36 observations, with an average of 4.4.
For movies, the range is 43 - 328, with an average of 116. Secondly, a Bayesian approach allows
for parameter uncertainty which may have an important effect on the expected profit from the
customized pricing example (Rossi, McCulloch, & Allenby, 1996).
6

Adams Media Research (2005) reports that $9.8 B USD was spent on rentals and $14.4 B USD was spent on

purchases. These figures are converted to units by using prices $3 and $20 for rental and purchase respectively.
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We put slightly informative but vague priors on the parameters of interest to ensure proper
posteriors, but primarily to let the data govern inferences (similar to Park & Bradlow, 2005). We
describe the estimation details and prior values chosen in appendix C. We employ Monte Carlo
sampling from a Markov Chain to obtain marginal parameter inferences (Gelfand & Smith, 1990).
Inferences were obtained using the Bayesian inference software, WinBUGS.

7

Inferences reported

for all parameters are based on the draws of two independent chains run for 120,000 iterations each,
discarding the first 100,000 iterations as burn-in, from over-dispersed starting values. Convergence
of the Markov chains (burn-in) was assessed by making use of the F-test statistic of Gelman and
Rubin (1992).

5

Empirical Results

We now turn to discuss the empirical findings. We first examine the ability of the model to fit
the data. Next, we use insights obtained from the model to discuss differences in buying and
renting choices across customers and movies. We then examine the managerial applications using
the model.

5.1

Model Fit and Findings

We estimate the model on the full set of 8,801 transactions. The log-marginal likelihood using the
importance sampling technique proposed by Newton and Raftery (1994) is −496.8. The hit rate is
0.36. While this may seem low, recall that buying is a rarely occurring event in the dataset with a
base rate of 0.03. The mean absolute error is 2.8%. In summary, the model appears to fit the data
well.

8

We next turn to investigating the model estimates.

We briefly review the implications of the coefficient’s sign. For the rent/buy model, a negative
coefficient decreases the geometric probability parameter p that the next viewing is the last. Hence,
7
8

Available at http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs.
We compare predictive fit to two benchmark models which we do not include for space. These models assume that

utility is stochastically related and decreasing on average over viewings. In the first model, the customer is forwardlooking and determines the threshold number of watchings endogenously as the solution to an optimal stopping
problem. In the second, the customer is assumed to be myopic. It outperforms these two other benchmark models
in out-of-sample validation tests.
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negative coefficients for the covariates imply greater expected viewings. Consequently, a negative
coefficient for a movie covariate implies that the consumer is more likely to buy rather than rent.
Table 2 presents the posterior mean and 95% Bayesian confidence interval of the model parameters. The first set of results display the mean population movie attribute sensitivity coefficients
(β¯1 , . . . β¯9 ) and the propensity to rent in bulk (β̄10 ). The large value of β¯1 indicates that, on average, the shifted geometric parameter p is large, the anticipated number of viewings (N ) is low, and
hence, on average customers are more likely to rent rather than buy. The average predicted probability of a purchase transaction is 0.024. This is consistent with the data: the average predicted
probability of a purchase transaction in the data is only 0.028. While the preferences for movie
attributes are individual specific, in aggregate movies which are rated R or are a romance have on
average less anticipated viewing and hence are more likely to be rented. Action movies have on
average more anticipated viewing, and hence are more likely to be bought. Lastly, the negative
value of the price plan intercept in the propensity to rent in bulk (β̄10 ), together with the positive
estimates of the two threshold parameters (θ2 and θ3 ) indicate (as mentioned before) that most
customers do not prepay for rentals in bulk.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
—————————————————————
The next set of results, presented in Table 3, indicate the amount of variation in these preferences for renting vs. buying, prepaying for rental in bulk, and the amount of variation in unexplained
movie characteristics. In particular these results relate to the ability of the rentailer to segment
its customer base. The diagonal elements in the variance covariance matrix (Σk,k ) are given first.
(The posterior mean estimates of the full 10 x 10 variance covariance matrix is given in appendix
D.) The large variation in individual propensities to rent (Σ1,1 ) relative to the variation in movie
characteristics (σe ) suggests that unobserved individual differences, rather than movie differences,
may explain the majority of variation in the rent vs. buy decision. Hence it may make more sense
for the rentailer to emphasize segmenting customers rather than movies.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
—————————————————————
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Table 3 also shows that there is substantial customer heterogeneity in the propensity to pay
for rentals in bulk (Σ10,10 ). We note that all the individual level coefficients are allowed to covary
with each other across the population of customers. One correlation of particular interest is that
between the individual propensity to rent (βi,1 ) and the propensity to prepay (βi,10 ). The posterior
correlation between these two parameters is −0.41.

9

This indicates that customers who have a

higher propensity to prepay in bulk for rentals are less intrinsic renters and more intrinsic buyers.
This would lend support to the argument that customers who prepay in bulk for rentals are more
serious “collectors,” rather than “watchers,” of movies. This could also be due to a simple income
effect, where customers who prepay in bulk hold their amount of renting constant and transfer their
savings from renting at a lower price to purchasing more titles. Empirically distinguishing between
these two stores would require at least some changes in price plan choices over time.
In the next section, we first examine differences across movies in our sample in terms of
expected viewings, average buy price and the number of purchases and rentals. We show that
ranking movies based on expected viewings rather than observed statistics yields more insights
about the buyability of various titles. Next, we turn to comparing customers. An advantage of the
panel data is that we can learn about individual customer sensitivities for different types of movies,
as well as propensities to buy or rent after controlling for these for observed movie characteristics.
This unobserved individual propensity for buying (vs. renting) has implications for whether the
customer (in the words of the former president of Sony Home Entertainment) is truly a “collector”
(i.e., an intrinsic buyer), merely an opportunistic buyer who purchases only when the price is low,
or a “watcher” (intrinsic renter). We explore this issue further below. Secondly, this individual
propensity to buy allows the rentailer to know for a given buy and rent price the likelihood that a
particular individual will buy a particular movie (given that the movie has already been selected
by the customer). Thus, the rentailer can customize prices to optimize transaction profit.

5.2

Classifying Movies Based on Anticipated Viewing

We compare movies by ranking them based on the posterior mean anticipated viewings, E[N·j ],
averaged across all rent and buy transactions with that movie. In Table 4, we present the top and
bottom five movies based on average E[N·j ]. Since the average masks some of the variability in
9

The correlation is calculated as follows: ρ1,10 = √

Σ1,10
Σ1,1

√
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Σ10,10

.

anticipated viewings, we present the upper 97.5 percentile across the transactions (the lower 2.5
percentile is the lower bound of the distribution for N , 1). Additionally we display the number
of rentals, purchases, and the average purchase price in our sample of 76 titles. Quiet American
has the greatest average anticipated viewings of the movies considered in the dataset at 3.36. The
distribution of anticipated viewings for this movie has a longer tail. The customers who value this
movie most anticipate watching it more than 10 times.
As one moves further down the table, average anticipated viewing rapidly decreases to slightly
above one. Movies at the top of the list, such as Lord of the Rings and Catch Me If You Can, are
expected to be watched more by customers who either rent or bought either movie, and hence they
are more likely to be bought. Movies at the bottom of the list, such as Life of David Gale and
How to Lose a Guy in 10 Days, are expected to be watched almost once, the lower bound of the
distribution on N . Hence, these movies are more likely to be rented.
Note that this rank based on latent expected viewings produces different results than ranking
movies based on the actual number of purchases. For example, Chicago was bought more often (13)
than Talk to Her (6) and Catch Me If You Can (11), yet it has a lower expected viewings than these
two titles. This could be due to a few reasons. First, Chicago is transacted more often, yet bought
less often. Hence, more “trials” but only slightly more “successes” implies lower expected viewings
for Chicago. Secondly, Chicago is priced (on average) lower than Catch Me If You Can, but more
than Talk to Her. Hence, the threshold for buying Chicago is lower than Catch Me If You Can. In
other words, Chicago purchases may imply, on average, lower values of expected viewing relative
to Catch Me If You Can. We revisit the expected anticipated viewings and movie differences taken
together with customer differences in the customized pricing section.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
—————————————————————

How would such viewing information be useful to managers? As discussed earlier, many
consumers are unable to predict their future usage accurately for a variety of product and service
categories (e.g., Nunes, 2000, and Miravete, 2002). Having usage-related information may affect
their choices, and hence, become an effective marketing tool for converting renters into buyers
(Nunes, 2000).
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5.3

Segmenting Customers: Collectors, Opportunistic Buyers, and Watchers

An advantage of the model is that it produces posterior distributions of individual-level preference
parameters. We focus on one in particular, βi,1 , which captures the extent to which any particular customer is more of a “collector” (intrinsic buyer), an opportunistic buyer, or a “watcher”
(intrinsic renter). The empirical results presented in the last section, which suggest that customer
differences rather than movie differences explain the majority of variation in the rent vs. buy
decision, underscore the importance to the rentailer of understanding its customers.
We seek a metric capable of quantifying the extent to which a particular customer is an
intrinsic buyer relative to the population of customers at the rentailer. To make it more comparable
to the “average” customer, we transform βi,1 by subtracting off the mean value, β¯1 and taking
expectations. We denote this new customer-level metric E[vi | data] and it is defined as:
E[vi | data] = E[βi,1 | data] − E[β¯1 | data]

(8)

A low value of this metric indicates that the customer more of an intrinsic buyer relative to the
population of customers. We argue and demonstrate below that this metric, derived from the
model, provides a superior customer segmentation than simple statistics based on only observable
data such as buy/rent ratios or the number of movies bought.
First, the metric E[vi | data] is able to capture differences between customers with the same
buy/rent ratio but with different number of transactions. Comparing customers in our dataset who
buy all the time, (i.e., the proportion of transactions which are purchases is one) a customer with
10 purchases should be more of a collector than a customer with 8. We illustrate this in Table
5. The metric E[vi | data] naturally accounts for differences in the number of observations across
consumers. For example in Table 5, customer 1 who buys 15 titles in 15 transactions has a lower
value of E[vi | data] than customer 2 who buys 10 titles in 10 transactions.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
—————————————————————

Secondly, the E[vi | data] metric naturally takes into account differences between “opportunistic” buyers, who buy only when the price is low enough, and “collectors,” or buyers who buy at
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any price, while holding the number of purchases constant. This is illustrated in Table 6 below for
a few customers who made 1 or 2 purchases out of 9 total transactions at the rentailer. Customer
23 purchases one movie at $ 9.99 while customer 28 purchases one movie at $ 29.99. Thus, it seems
likely that customer 23 is more of an opportunistic buyer than customer 28. This is reflected in the
difference of E[vi | data] for the two customers. This pattern is also illustrated for two customers
who make two purchases out of 9 transactions as well. Customer 17, who pays the least on average,
has a higher posterior mean E[vi | data] than customer 21, who pay more on average to purchase.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 6 About Here]
—————————————————————
Finally, and somewhat more subtly, the E[vi | data] metric weighs purchases of rentable titles
more than buyable titles. Holding rentals, purchases, and prices constant, a customer who buys a
less buyable title signals that he or she is more of an intrinsic buyer than a customer who buys
a more popular often-bought title. In other words, the model infers that the reason for buying
is due more to the customer rather than the movie. This is illustrated in Table 7. Customers 88
and 84 have the same “summary” statistic profile - 1 purchase at $9.99, and 3 rentals. Customer
84 purchased a very buyable movie, Quiet American, which had the greatest average anticipated
viewings according to Table 4. Customer 88 purchased a less buyable (but rented often) title, Die
Another Day (from the James Bond franchise). We see that as a result, customer 88 has a lower
(more negative) E[vi | data] value, indicating that that customer is more of an intrinsic buyer, than
customer 84. We can also compare customers 120 and 142, who buy Lord of the Rings: Two Towers,
the most frequently bought title in our database, with customers 70 and 64, who buy Bowling for
Columbine. While we cannot exactly hold constant the other factors discussed - price paid, and
ratio of purchases to rentals - these customers are very close in terms of these other statistics and
differences in E[vi | data] are likely due to differences in the purchased title. As expected, we find
that customers 70 and 64 have lower values of the metric than customers 120 and 142. Hence, they
are more intrinsic buyers (i.e., collectors).
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 7 About Here]
—————————————————————
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In summary, we have argued that the metric E[vi | data] combines information from three
different sources - the buy/rent transaction ratio, price paid, and popularity of movie purchased.
It is well-suited for segmenting customers along the continuum of being either “collectors,” “opportunistic buyers” or “watchers” and is useful for the retailer in order to gain better insight into
its customer base. A natural question is: given these intrinsic customer propensities, how can the
retailer increase the profitability from such customers? We explore this issue further in the next
section.

5.4

Converting Potential Rent Transactions: Customized Purchase Price

The rentailer’s profit margin is larger when a customer purchases rather than rents. Under a
typical revenue-sharing agreement, the rentailer pays a one-time fee of $2-$4 per title and 40% of
the rental revenue to the distributor (Said, 1999; Roehl & Varian, 2001). Ignoring the fixed cost, this
implies that the marginal revenue to the rentailer is approximately $2.10 (= 3.50 × 0.60) per rental
transaction. The wholesale cost to the rentailer of procuring a new title for sale is $14 (Gertner,
2004). The typical retail selling price is $20, which means the profit to the rentailer of selling a new
title is $6, three times the profit from a rental transaction. The margin is likely to be even higher
for previously viewed titles (PVT). Hence, converting potential rent transactions into purchase is of
interest to the rentailer. This can be achieved through pitching expected utilization to a particular
customer (“I believe that you will watch Lord of the Rings four times”) as the customer approaches
the check-out counter with a movie that he or she intends to rent. This may be done separate from
or in conjunction with customizing a purchase price that maximizes expected long-run transaction
profit of the rentailer. In customizing prices, we choose to focus on the profitability of the rentailer,
taking into account competitive prices. That is, we focus on converting potential rent transactions,
a major opportunity for a rentailer where there are on average 34 rentals for every purchase.
Customized pricing applications are becoming available in various retail outlets due to cheaper
and more comprehensive technology. For example, IBM’s Shopping Buddy can store grocery lists,
loyalty program benefits, in addition to giving personalized discounts on preferred brands (Shermach, 2004). In the home video retail market, Blockbuster has begun to use customized e-coupons
to induce customers that rent online to purchase PVTs from local offline stores. In the general context of targeted promotions, Rossi et al. (1996) show how a retailer can use posterior distributions
of a choice model to customize coupon values based on consumer transaction history. We follow
20

a similar strategy in customizing purchase prices for a sample of transactions from our data. In
the current rent vs. buy problem there is an important difference with price customization in the
previous literature. In the current setting, the firm is guaranteed renting the movie as the price of
buying increases. Thus there is a lower bound on the firm’s profitability from price customization
that is absent from the typical price customization scenarios considered (e.g., buy Brand A vs. buy
Brand B).
It is important to note that our customizing price illustrations are conditional on the movie
title already being selected by the customer at the rentailer. What is envisioned here is the following
scenario: (1) the customer roams the store (or to an online rentailer’s outlet) with a title he or she
intends to rent; (2) the customer then proceeds to the checkout point; and (3) based on the output
of the model, the rentailer offers the customer a “one-time only” chance to buy the movie at the
customized price. This scenario may be more feasible in an online environment.
We consider two scenarios, one in which only a new title is available, and one in which a PVT
is also available in addition to the new title.

10

We take into consideration that a customer who

does not purchase and expects to watch a title only two times (for example) will return and re-rent
the movie. We assume that the period between renting is fixed, and allow for a discount rate δ over
this period.

11

Thus, the rentailer receives a series of discounted profits from the customer if he or

she chooses to rent or re-rent, or an up-front amount if he or she chooses to buy. The rentailer is
maximizing the expected long term profit for both new and PVT titles.
The rentailer’s expected total profit from consumer i and title j is:
Scenario 1 : E[π̃N ] =

Pτ (KN ,k)
t=1

P (Nij = t | θ̃)

Pt

s=1 δ

s−1 m k
r

+ Pij (Buy | θ̃, KN , k)(KN − cN )

if only a new title is available
Pτ (K
P
,k)
Scenario 2 : E[π̃P V T ] = t=1 P V T P (Nij = t | θ̃) ts=1 δ s−1 mr k + Pij (Buy | θ̃, KP V T , k)(KP V T − cP V T )
if a PVT is also available
(9)
where θ̃ is a vector that denotes the model parameters, cN is the wholesale cost of a new DVD
to the rentailer, cP V T is the cost of the PVT, and mr is the rentailer margin from renting, and
τ = floor[K/k] is the ratio of the buy to rent price. We set the wholesale cost cN =$14.00,
in line with most sell-through title pricing, the cost of a PVT, cP V T = $3.00, and the margin
10
11

We assume that if both a PVT and a new title are available, the customer will opt for the lower PVT price.
We set δ = 0.95 in the customized pricing example. If δ = 1, then there is no discounting.
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from renting mr = 0.6 (Said, 1999; Gertner, 2004). Under scenario 1, searching over a range,
cN ≤ KN ≤ K̄N , where K̄N is the average competitive price for a new title, at each value of
KN we simulate the posterior distribution of expected total profit by drawing from the posterior
distribution of θ̃. Under scenario 2, we search over a range cP V T ≤ KP V T ≤ K̄P V T where K̄P V T
is the average competitive price for a previously viewed title. The posterior distribution of θ̃
allows us to incorporate uncertainty about the individual’s willingness to purchase and the movie’s
purchasability and measure their effects on the posterior distribution of expected transaction profits
to the retailer. In the case of the new title, we vary KN in increments of $0.25 from $14.00 to $24.00,
which represents the competitive price for a new title. In the case of the PVT, we vary KP V T from
$3.00 to $15.00, which represents the upper bound to competitive prices for PVTs available on
Ebay, for example. We then calculate averaged posterior expected profits from a sample of 2000
draws in order to find the profit-maximizing K for the new and PVT title for equation 9.
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 8 About Here]
—————————————————————

In Table 8 we illustrate some examples with specific profit-maximizing new and PVT prices
alongside the new purchase price and the expected anticipated number of viewings (E[Nij ]). In
keeping with our proposed scenario of converting rental to purchase transactions, all of the transactions in Table 8 (e.g., customer 26, Gangs of New York) are titles that the customer chose to
rent in our data.

12

Customer 26 bought two titles at full price ($22.99 and $17.99) and rented

seven titles in our sample over the 6 month period. We calculate the expected profit-maximizing
purchase price for several of the titles this customer rented. For example, the movie Gangs of New
York has a prevailing shelf price of $22.99. The expected profit maximizing price ($24.00) is at the
upper bound of our customized price region. Since the expected anticipated number of viewings
for this customer-movie combination is already high (7.00) and this customer has demonstrated
that he or she may be an intrinsic buyer by paying full price for two titles, the rentailer should
not have to lower prices in order to induce a purchase. If a PVT copy is available, the expected
profit-maximizing PVT price is $15.00 (also at the upper bound).
12

That is, in line with our proposed mechanism, we are taking movies already selected for rental by the customer,

and proposing “one-time only” customized purchase prices.
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We can also see how the new and PVT expected profit maximizing prices of another title,
How to Lose a Guy in 10 Days, vary across three different customers. Customer 24 who buys two
movies at discount and rents eleven, is less of an intrinsic buyer than customers 26 and 21. The
expected profit maximizing price for a new video for customer 24 is $17.25, $6.50 less than that of
customer 26 and $1.75 less than customer 21.
We can focus attention on the profit-maximizing prices of the same movie (How to Lose a
Guy in 10 Days) for customers 26 and 21, both of whom have similar summary statistics (i.e.,
two purchases, seven rentals). Customer 21 appears to command a lower profit-maximizing price
than Customer 26. This is due to the difference in expected viewing: customer 21 is expected to
watch the movie less than 26, and thus needs further price discounting in order to be persuaded to
buy. Of course the discounting comes at the expense of rentailer profits, and the procedure trades
off the increase in probability of buying by lowering the price with the reduced profit conditional
on purchase. Note that a feature of the current problem that is different than typical customized
pricing examples is that the expected profit asymptotes to a strictly positive value even as the buy
price becomes large. This is due to the fact that the rentailer is “guaranteed” renting the movie
for k, because if the buy price K is extremely high the consumer will always rent with probability
1. Thus the margin from renting is a lower bound on the expected profitability for the rentailer.

6

Discussion

In this paper, we model the consumer’s decision to rent or buy a particular movie at a video outlet
and test it using unique panel data from a rentailer. To our knowledge, this is the first research that
has attempted to model this particular decision with individual level data. We model the consumer,
in line with previous research, as calculating a breakeven threshold, based on the costs and benefits
of renting and buying. Applying that model to our data, where buying is a relatively rare (but
profitable) event (3% of transactions, 7% of customers) for the rentailer, we find substantively that
(1) that individual differences rather than title differences explain the majority of variation in the
buying vs. rent decision, (2) customers who have a greater propensity to pay a lower price for
rentals (through buying in bulk) have a greater propensity to buy rather than rent, and (3) action
titles are more likely to be bought whereas romances and titles with an R-rating are more likely
to be rented. Using posterior model estimates we show that a particular metric that summarizes
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information on customer history, prices paid, and popularity of titles bought can be used to segment
customers according to a latent tendency to buy at full price, buy at a lower price, or rent. Finally,
we demonstrate that the model can be used to help convert more renters into buyers. Expected
viewings for a particular customer-title pair, as estimated by the model, can be pitched to the
customer in order to persuade customers that a purchased movie will be well utilized. The model
can also be used to generate customized expected profit maximizing prices for new and PVT titles
that may be available in the rentailer.
We offer two possibilities for further research. Firstly, we chose in this paper to model only
the rent/buy decision conditional on movie choice. This is in line with research in the video game
market, where the purchase decision is modeled separately for each game (Nair, 2007). Future
work, if the right data exist, could integrate such a model with other customer decisions such as
whether to view the movie in the theater, wait until released to home video, or cable TV. For
example, Cleeren, Dekimpe and Verboven (2006) use aggergate data on the number of video rental
stores per geographic area and find that rentailers face more competition from “upstream” sources
such as movie theaters rather than premium TV channels. Secondly, in this paper we demonstrated
room for improved profitability via the customization of prices. Such dynamic pricing, admittedly,
is not easy to implement in practice, particularly in an offline environment. It would also be costly
(computer system, training, incentives for clerks, slowing down checkout times, etc.). It may be
more cost efficient in an online environment. Clearly, this issue deserves future consideration.
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Appendices
A

Proof of Equation 2

Since the survivor function of the shifted-geometric distribution is (1 − p)t (ignoring subscripts), it
follows that
P (Buy | p) = P (N ≥ τ ) = S(τ − 1) = (1 − p)τ −1
where S() is the survivor function.
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(10)

B

List of Movies Used in Analysis
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 9 About Here]
—————————————————————
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C

Estimation Details

We assume standard prior distributional forms for the hierarichical parameters and place large
variances on the prior distributions so that the data, rather than the prior, govern parameter inferences (Congdon, 2003). The mean vector and variance covariance matrix of customer preferences
are given normal and inverse-Wishart distributions:
β̄j

∼ N(0, 100)

(11)

Σ ∼ Inv-Wishart(R, df )
where R = I10 and df = 10. The variance parameter of movie unobserved characteristics in
equation 3 is given a diffuse inverse gamma prior.
σe2 ∼ Inv-Gamma(0.01, 0.01)

(12)

Lastly, for the rental price plan model, we set the prior variance of the estimated thresholds σθ2 = 100
We observe individuals i = 1, . . . , I who choose to either rent or buy j = 1, . . . , Ji movies.
Define cij as the binary indicator that equals 1 if i buys j otherwise zero, and ti = {1, 2, 3, 4} as
the indicator of which rental price plan was chosen by customer i. Define the observation matrix
C = (cij ), the probability matrix for the model Pb = P (Buyij ), T = (ti ) as the vector of rental
price plan choices for each customer and Pt = P (Ti = k) as the probability for the price plans.
The likelihood for the model is a product of Bernoulli probabilities (for the rent/buy choice) and
ordinal probabilities for the (for the rental price plan model).
L(C, T | Pb, Pt) =

I Y
4
Y

(P (Ti = k))ti =k

i k=1

Ji
Y

P (Buyij )cij (1 − P (Buyij ))1−cij

(13)

j

Denote θ as the complete set of parameters with priors over them. The marginal posterior for
a particular parameter θq amounts to integrating the product of the likelihood and prior over all
other parameters, θ−q .
f (θq | C, T) ∝

I Y
4 Z
Y
i k=1

(P (Ti = k))ti =k

Ji Z
Y

P (Buyij )cij (1 − P (Buyij ))1−cij π(θ) dθ−q

(14)

j

Since the above integrals cannot be computed in closed-form, we use standard Monte Carlo simulation routines to make inferences in the parameters.
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D

Estimated Variance Covariance Matrix (Σ)
—————————————————————
[Insert Table 10 About Here]
—————————————————————
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Retailer

Sell-Through

Rental

On / Off-line

Vudu

Y

Y

On

Amazon

Y

Y

On

Columbia House

Y

N

On

Movielink

Y

N

On

CinemaNow

Y

N

On

Wal-Mart

Y

N

On/Off

Netflix

Y

Y

On

QwikFliks

N

Y

On

Blockbuster

Y

Y

On/Off

Movie Gallery

Y

Y

On/Off

The Video Station

Y

Y

On/Off

Apple iTunes

Y

Y

On

Table 1: Taxonomy of Video Retailer Business Models
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Figure 1: Histograms of Buying and Renting in the Population (Out of 2,018 Consumers)

3
31+

Posterior
Parameter

95% Posterior Interval

Mean

Lower

Upper

Intercept (β¯1 )

1.214∗

0.748

1.629

Box Office Gross (β¯2 )

-0.027

-0.242

0.257

MetaCritic (β¯3 )

-0.255

-0.572

0.004

Rated R (β¯4 )

0.397∗

0.010

0.765

Drama (β¯5 )

0.232

-0.131

0.744

Action (β¯6 )

-0.341∗

-0.556

-0.033

Thriller (β¯7 )

0.134

-0.346

0.583

Romance (β¯8 )

0.480∗

0.142

1.261

Major Distributor (β¯9 )

-0.019

-0.207

0.197

Intercept Price Plan (β̄10 )

-2.190∗

-2.375

-2.037

Threshold 1 (θ1 ) (fixed)

0

Threshold 2 (θ2 )

0.471∗

0.371

0.578

Threshold 3 (θ3 )

1.623∗

1.383

1.886

∗

95% posterior interval excludes zero.

Table 2: Posterior mean estimates and 95% confidence intervals of population preference coefficients
(β¯1 , . . . β¯9 ), propensity to prepay for rentals in bulk (β̄10 ), and estimated thresholds (θ1 , θ2 , θ3 ).
Negative sign for β¯1 , . . . β¯9 imply more likely to buy (vs. rent); for β̄10 negative sign means less
likely to prepay for rentals in bulk.

Posterior

95% Posterior Interval

Parameter

Mean

Lower

Upper

Unobs. Individual heterogeneity (Σ1,1 )

0.384

0.176

0.666

Box Office Gross (Σ2,2 )

0.120

0.061

0.219

MetaCritic (Σ3,3 )

0.121

0.062

0.205

Rated R (Σ4,4 )

0.364

0.136

0.706

Drama (Σ5,5 )

0.183

0.073

0.467

Action (Σ6,6 )

0.176

0.067

0.387

Thriller (Σ7,7 )

0.174

0.076

0.358

Romance (Σ8,8 )

0.412

0.127

0.934

Major Distributor (Σ9,9 )

0.157

0.078

0.295

Unobs. Price Plan heterogeneity (Σ10,10 )

0.358

0.116

0.918

Unobs. Movie heterogeneity (σe2 )

0.081

0.029

0.172

Table 3: Diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix (Σk,k ) and unobserved movie heterogeneity (σe ) posterior mean estimates and 95% confidence intervals.

Rank

Title

Average E[N·j ]

97.5 %tile

Rent

Buy

Avg. Price ($)

1

QUIET AMERICAN

3.36

14.04

125

7

18.17

2

TALK TO HER

2.63

8.06

79

6

16.98

3

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN

2.62

8.04

112

11

22.52

4

CHICAGO

2.35

7.85

201

13

21.94

5

LORD OF THE RINGS: TWO TOWERS

2.30

6.74

262

19

21.91

72

HOW TO LOSE A GUY IN 10 DAYS

1.23

2.23

173

0

17.99

73

HOUSE OF 1,000 CORPSES

1.22

1.99

78

0

20.99

74

BOAT TRIP

1.21

2.28

76

0

23.99

75

GURU

1.21

2.17

47

0

22.99

76

LIFE OF DAVID GALE

1.19

2.05

179

0

25.19

Table 4: Top and bottom 5 titles based on the posterior mean of E[N·j ] averaged across transactions,
along with the upper 97.5 percentile of expected anticipated viewings, the number of rentals,
purchases, and the average purchase price observed in the data.

Customer

Transactions

# Buys

Buy proportion

E[vi | data]

1

15

15

1.00

-2.16

2

10

10

1.00

-1.12

5

8

8

1.00

-0.93

27

2

2

1.00

-0.84

30

1

1

1.00

-0.35

Table 5: Comparing customers who always buy.

Customer

Transactions

# Buys

Buy proportion

E[vi | data]

Avg. Price Paid ($)

23

9

1

0.11

-0.12

9.99

28

9

1

0.11

-0.73

29.99

17

9

2

0.22

-0.34

8.99

21

9

2

0.22

-1.09

19.99

Table 6: Comparing customers with different prices paid.

Customer

# Buys / # Rents

E[vi | data]

Price Paid

84

1/3

-0.178

9.99

QUIET AMERICAN

88

1/3

-0.299

9.99

DIE ANOTHER DAY

120

1/13

-0.371

21.99

LORD OF THE RINGS: TWO TOWERS

142

1/12

-0.361

21.99

LORD OF THE RINGS: TWO TOWERS

70

1/11

-0.715

20.99

BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE

64

1/12

-0.832

24.29

BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE

Title Purchased

Table 7: Comparing customers with different titles purchased, holding price, rentals and purchases
constant

Cust

Title

Prevailing

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Anticipated

Buy

(New)

(PVT)

Viewings

Price

Buy Price

Buy Price

E[Nij ]

26

GANGS OF NEW YORK

22.99

24.00

15.00

7.00

26

HOW TO LOSE A GUY IN 10 DAYS

17.99

23.75

14.75

3.06

26

RAISING VICTOR VARGAS

21.99

23.75

14.75

3.48

24

HOW TO LOSE A GUY IN 10 DAYS

17.99

17.25

6.75

1.42

24

ABOUT SCHMIDT

18.95

20.75

10.25

2.01

21

HHOW TO LOSE A GUY IN 10 DAYS

17.99

19.00

8.00

2.16

Table 8: Illustration of customized new and PVT prices, prevailing new title prices, and expected
antipicated viewings for customers 26, 24 & 21

Movie Titles
2 FAST 2 FURIOUS

HOUSE OF 1,000 CORPSES

25TH HOUR

HOW TO LOSE A GUY IN 10 DAYS

ABOUT SCHMIDT

HUNTED

ADAPTATION

IDENTITY

ANALYZE THAT

IRREVERSIBLE

ANGER MANAGEMENT

JERRY SEINFELD COMEDIAN

ANIMATRIX

JUST MARRIED

ANTWONE FISHER

KID STAYS IN THE PICTURE

BASIC

LAUREL CANYON

BEND IT LIKE BECKHAM

LIFE OF DAVID GALE

BOAT TRIP

LORD OF THE RINGS: TWO TOWERS

BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE

LOST IN LA MANCHA

BRINGING DOWN THE HOUSE

LOVE LIZA

BULLETPROOF MONK

MALIBU’S MOST WANTED

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN

MAN APART, A

CHICAGO

MIGHTY WIND

CONFESSIONS OF A DANGEROUS MIND

NARC

CONFIDENCE

OLD SCHOOL

CORE

PHONEBOOTH

DADDY DAY CARE

PIANIST

DANCER UPSTAIRS

PUNCH-DRUNK LOVE

DAREDEVIL

QUIET AMERICAN

DARK BLUE

RABBIT-PROOF FENCE

DELIVER US FROM EVA

RAISING VICTOR VARGAS

DIE ANOTHER DAY

REAL WOMEN HAVE CURVES

DREAMCATCHER

RECRUIT

DYSFUNKTIONAL FAMILY

RUSSIAN ARK

FINAL DESTINATION 2

SECRETARY

FRIDA

SHANGHAI KNIGHTS

GANGS OF NEW YORK

SHAPE OF THINGS

GODS AND GENERALS

SOLARIS

GOOD THIEF

SPIDER

GURU

SPIRITED AWAY

HE LOVES ME/HE LOVES ME NOT

SPUN

HEAD OF STATE

TALK TO HER

HEAVEN

TEARS OF THE SUN

HOLES

TWO WEEKS NOTICE

HOURS

VIEW FROM THE TOP

Table 9: List of Movies Used in the Analysis

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

Unobs. ind. hetero.

0.384

2

Box office gross

0.038

0.120

3

MetaCritic

0.037

0.020

0.121

4

Rated R

0.193

0.070

0.034

0.364

5

Drama

-0.009

0.018

-0.026

0.006

0.183

6

Action

0.058

-0.010

0.020

0.034

-0.018

0.176

7

Thriller

-0.007

-0.005

0.004

-0.022

0.001

-0.007

0.174

8

Romance

0.165

0.048

0.023

0.159

0.049

0.056

-0.001

0.412

9

Major distributor

-0.008

-0.005

0.005

-0.023

-0.037

0.002

-0.002

-0.016

0.157

10

Unobs. ind. price

-0.167

-0.025

-0.021

-0.139

0.000

-0.033

-0.002

-0.083

-0.003

Table 10: Mean posterior estimates of Variance Covariance Matrix (Σ)

43

10

0.358

